




Experimental evidence on inflation expectation formation
Pfajfar, D.; Zakelj, B.
Published in:







Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Pfajfar, D., & Zakelj, B. (2014). Experimental evidence on inflation expectation formation. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 44, 147-168. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2014.04.012
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
Supplementary Material for:
Experimental Evidence on Inflation Expectation
Formation
Damjan Pfajfar∗





This supplementary material presents some additional analysis, robustness checks,
and experimantal instructions.
∗Department of Economics, Tilburg School of Economics and Management, P.O. Box 90153, NL-5000
LE Tilburg, Netherlands. E-mail : D.Pfajfar@uvt.nl. Web: https://sites.google.com/site/dpfajfar/.
†Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain. Email : blaz.zakelj@upf.edu.
1
1 Additional Analysis: Form of the ALM
We investigate which parameters are non-zero in the actual law of motion (ALM). Note
that as long we do not omit any relevant variables from the ALM and allowing all the
relevant variables to be non-zero, this constitutes a test of rational expectations. Table S1
below presents the results of estimating eq. (10) in the paper. As we can see in the table
both first and second lags of inflation turn out to be significant in all treatments. The
first lag of output gap is significant in Treatments 2-4, while the second lag is significant
in treatment 1. Interest rate is also in Treatments 1-3 (in treatment 4 we cannot include it
in the specification due to perfect multicollinearity that is due to contemporaneous Taylor
rule). Next step is to compare the estimated form of ALM with REE. With respect to the
first representation of the REE, see eq. (5), we can immediately conclude that the ALM
includes also 2 lags of inflation, second lag of output gap and interest rate in Treatments
1-3. Thus, the representation is not the same as for REE representation 1. Regarding
representation 2, which is detailed in eq. (6) and takes into account that subjects "are
extracting" information of the shocks, we observe that our estimated ALMs are closer
to this representation. Especially the strong significance of the lag of interest rates are
suggestive of the existence of this equilibria. However, in this representation both the
first and the second lag of output gap should be significant and the second lag of inflation
should not be significant. Our estimations suggest that one of the lags of output gap is
not significant while the second lag of inflation is always significant. Thus, according to
the definition in the Appendix to this letter this equilibria is characterized by Misspecified
Perception Equilibria level 2 (MPE2). This holds for treatment 2-4, while in Treatment
1 due to significance of lagged output gap one could define a higher order MPE. Indeed,
this equilibria are very similar to the Behavioral Learning Equilibria of Hommes and Zhu
(2014), but it includes also the second lag of inflation. PLMs that result in a MPE2
are trend extrapolation rules (M5 and M9). Properties of the MPE2, that are carefully
studied in the companion paper, Pfajfar and Žakelj (2011), suggests that this equilibrium
is both indeterminate (with the exception of treatment 3) and E-unstable (with complex
roots).
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We can conclude that our equilibrium has both elements of REE representation 2 and
MPE2.1 However, REE representation 2 yields both a determinate and E-stable outcome
(see the companion paper for details). If we compare the dynamic properties of both
equilibria and those of the realized series from the experiments, we see that actually the
dynamic properties of most sessions (see Figures in the Appendix) are closer to those
expected under the MPE2 than under the REE representation 2. Therefore, we would
characterize this (temporary) equilibrium as a more complex version of the MPE2 where
(some) subjects also extract information about the shocks.
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4
πt−1 1.6721*** 1.7542*** 1.3749*** 1.6558***
(0.0084) (0.0098) (0.0152) (0.0029)
πt−2 -0.9101*** -0.9074*** -0.7191*** -0.8565***
(0.0093) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0094)
yt−1 -0.0310 0.1443*** 0.1625*** 0.2606***
(0.0457) (0.0208) (0.0247) (0.0869)
yt−2 0.1097** -0.0314 -0.0220 -0.1231
(0.0475) (0.0255) (0.0338) (0.0805)
it−1 0.0255*** 0.0264*** 0.0023***
(0.0006) (0.0036) (0.0004)
cons 0.6437*** 0.3793*** 1.0089*** 0.6160***
(0.0396) (0.0064) (0.0425) (0.0244)
N 3.672 3.672 3.672 3.672
Wald χ2 4.11 · 1010 1.79 · 107 6.15 · 105 9.54 · 105
Table S1: Estimates of ALM for each treatment. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
are calculated using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account po-
tential presence of clusters in groups. */**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent
level.
1In this letter, we focus on the discussion of the form of the solution, but also the coeffcients could
be non-optimal and the eqilibrium could just be a temporary eqilibrium. See our companion paper for
more analysis on the effect of non-optimal coeffi cients.
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2 Additional Analysis: Convergence
We designed both a dynamic panel data regression and one without lagged dependant
variable as a regressor to study whether a time trend has an effect on the likelihood of
forming expectations rationally (RATt). Regressions acctually show that the likelihood
of forming expectations with rational expectations is (significantly) negatively affected
by a time trend, although the effect is relative small. Significant inertia is displayed in
the dynamic panel data regressions as one would expect based on summary statistics (RE
model does not switch to other models in 94.6% of the cases). We have also checked if
there is a time trend in the inertia and found no evidence of a time-varying inertia. Thus,
we can conclude that we failed to find any evidence of global convergence.
RATt Probit, PA Probit, RE Logit, PA Logit, RE Logit, FE dyn panel
πt−1 -0.0081 -0.0096 -0.0129 -0.0172 -0.0121 0.0098**
(0.0461) (0.0747) (0.0761) (0.1365) (0.0198) (0.0050)
yt−1 0.0716 0.0940 0.1149 0.1588 0.1626*** -0.0015
(0.0443) (0.0650) (0.0726) (0.1108) (0.0345) (0.0053)
it−1 -0.0032 -0.0065 -0.0055 -0.0066 -0.0109 -0.0107***
(0.0263) (0.0397) (0.0431) (0.0690) (0.0178) (0.0032)
time trend -0.0021 -0.0025 -0.0033 -0.0054 -0.0053*** -0.0010**
(0.0040) (0.0059) (0.0065) (0.0108) (0.0013) (0.0004)(
πt−1 − πkt−1|t−2
)2
-0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0012 0.0001
(0.0111) (0.0135) (0.0190) (0.0224) (0.0016) (0.0013)
RATt−1 0.7901***
(0.0189)
cons 0.1034 0.0751 0.1605 0.1500 0.1503***
(0.1440) (0.2249) (0.2328) (0.4289) (0.0218)
N 13608 13608 13608 13608 12789 13608
Wald χ2 4.149 3.134 4.014 3.497 65.388 2647.896
Table S2: Determinants of using Rational Expectations. Notes: RE stands for random
effects, PA population averagesand FE for Fixed effects. Dyn panel is conducted using
the system GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) for dynamic panels.. Standard
errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that
take into account potential presence of clusters in groups. */**/*** denotes significance
at 10/5/1 percent level.
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3 Results for Specific Models
In this subsection we present some general patterns of estimated models. Estimations
of the sticky information type model (M2) suggest that about 97% of agents display a
significantly positive λ1, with the average λ1 0.20.
All the participants have ϑ positive and significant at a 5 percent level in the estimation
of M3. 13.4% of participants have a constant gain parameter significantly lower than 1,
while 53.7% of them update their forecasts with an error correction term significantly
greater than 1. This means that the latter agents possibly overreact to their past errors.
Their prevalence might imply problems with dynamic stability in certain treatments. If
the estimated parameter (ι in this version) is significantly different from 0, we conclude
that agents actually learn from their past mistakes with a decreasing gain over time. Our
tests do not support the hypothesis that the coeffi cient decreases over time as the R2 is
always greater (for all subjects) for a constant gain model.
In the case of the trend extrapolation model (M5) we find that the constant is signif-
icant at the 5% level in 28.7% of cases while the τ 1 is significant in 78.2% of cases at the
same level. Most of the times τ 1 is between 0 and 1, but there are a few cases when τ 1
is significantly below 0 (6.9%) and for 15.3% of subjects it is significantly higher than 1.
We refer to these rules as strong trend extrapolation.
By estimating the General model (M6) we find that 81.9% of agents take inflation
into account when making their predictions. These results give an indication of which
variables are most commonly used for forecasting in our experiment. Thus, inflation is
the most commonly used as an explanatory variable for inflation forecasts, while only
a small proportion of subjects implement lags of output gap in their forecasts. About
56.0% of subjects take the interest rate into account. This suggests that at least for some
subjects it will be diffi cult to not to reject the RE of the representation 1.2 ,3
2Estimation of the extended M6 that included also the subjects’ previous forecasts suggest that
66.7% subjects also consider their own forecast from the previous period for forecasting (together with
the estimation of M2-M4). This implies that a high proportion of subjects based their forecasts on
private information (previous period forecasts of other subjects were not directly observable).
3We also investigate the nature of the forecast error in more depth. We estimate a model where we
regress the forecast errors on past observed forecast error and changes of other macroeconomic variables.
Subjects often do not exploit the informational content of the output gap and most importantly subjects
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We find that 56.5% of participants learn according to the first setup with lagged
inflation, as in model (M7). The gain parameter ϑ is in the range between 0.0001 and
0.1000, with a mean value of 0.02900 and the median is 0.01125. We also estimate adaptive
learning with the PLMs that include the lagged output gap (M8) and the AR(1) form
(M10). However, these models rarely outperform the other models studied here. In the
learning version of the trend extrapolation model (M9) 31.5% of our subjects have positive
gains. The optimal gains are on average slightly higher than before as they range between
0.0003 and 0.7900 with a mean value of 0.0654 (the median is 0.0310). This version of
the PLM (M9) often performs better than previous versions of learning in terms of root
mean square error (RMSE). In Section 5.4 we compare different models and find that
this version of constant gain learning indeed best represents the behavior of a significant
proportion of our subjects. As an alternative approach to determine the average gain,
we exclude from our sample all subjects for whom learning does not represent the best
model.4 In this case, we find that the average gain of these subjects is 0.0447 with a
standard deviation of 0.0537 (the median is 0.0260). The standard deviation is quite
high as there are a few very high values, but most of the gains fall in the range between
0.01 and 0.07.
overreact to the last observed change of inflation. As the coeffi cient in front of the change in inflation is
in most cases higher than 1, we can say many subject are pessimistic about the future developments of
inflation. This feature is repeatedly found in the survey data literature.
4We will consider Comparison 1 from Table 5 and exclude model (M8) as it is generally associated
with extremely high values of the gain parameter.
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4 Experimental Instructions
Thank you for participating in this experiment, a project of economic investigation.5 Your
earnings depend on your decisions and the decisions of the other participants. There is a
show up fee of the 4 Euros assured. From now on until the end of the experiment you are
not allowed to communicate with each other. If you have some question raise your hand
and one of the instructors will answer the question in private. Please do not ask aloud.
The Experiment
All participants receive exactly the same instructions. You and 8 other subjects all
participate as agents in the same fictitious economy. You will have to predict future
values of given economic variables. The experiment consists of 70 periods. The rules are
the same in all the periods. You will interact with the same 8 subjects during the whole
experiment.
Imagine that you work in a firm where you have to predict inflation for the next
period. Your profit depends on the accuracy of your inflation expectation.
Information in Each Period
The economy will be described with 3 variables in this experiment: the inflation rate, the
output gap, and the interest rate.
• Inflation measures general rise in prices in the economy. Each period it depends
on the inflation expectations of the agents in economy (you and other 8 participants
in this experiment), output gap and small random shocks.
• The output gapmeasures for how much (in %) the actual Gross Domestic Product
differs from the potential one. If the output gap is greater than 0, it means that the
economy is producing more than the potential level, if negative, less than potential
5Instructions used for experiments at Universitat Pompeu Fabra are in the Spanish language. In
experimental sessions, they were accompanied with the screenshots of the experimental interface and the
profit table with earnings for various combinations of estimation error and confidence interval.
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level. It depends each period on inflation expectations of the agents in economy,
past output gap, interest rate and small random shocks.
• The interest rate is (in this experiment) the price of borrowing the money (in %)
for one period. The interest rate is set by the monetary authority. Their decision
mostly depends on inflation (expectations) of the agents in economy.
All given variables might be relevant for inflation forecast, but it is up to you to work
out their relation and possible benefit of knowing them. The evolution of variables will
partly depend on the inputs of you and other subjects and also different random shocks
influencing the economy.
• You enter the economy in period 1. In this period you will be given computer
generated past values of inflation, output gap and interest rate for 10 periods back
(Called: -9, -8, . . . -1, 0)
• In period 2 you will be given all past values as seen in period 1 plus the value from
period 1 (Periods: -9, -8, . . . 0, 1).
• In period 3 you will see all past values as in period 2 (Periods: -9, -8, . . . 1, 2) plus
YOUR prediction about inflation in period 2 that you made in period 1.
• In period t you will see all past values of actual inflation up to period (Periods: -9,
-8, . . . , ) and your predictions up to period (Periods: 2, 3, . . . , ).
What Do You Have to Decide?
Your payoff will depend on the accuracy of your prediction of the inflation in the future
period. In each period your prediction will consist of two parts:
1. Expected inflation, (in %) that you expect to be in the NEXT period (Exp.Inf.)
2. The Confidence Interval (Conf.Int.) around your prediction for which you think
there is 95% probability that the actual inflation will fall into. The interval is
determined as the number of percentage points for which the actual inflation can
be higher or lower.
8
Example 1 Let’s say you think that inflation in the next period will be 3.7%. And you
also think there is most likely (95% probability) that the actual inflation will not differ
from that value for more than 0.7 percentage points. Therefore, you expect that there is
95% probability that actual inflation in the next period will be between 3.0% and 4.4%
(3.7%± 0.7%). Your inputs in the experiment will be 3.7 under 1) and 0.7 under 2).












whereExp.Inf . is your expectation about the inflation in the NEXT period, Conf.Int.
is the confidence interval you have chosen, Inflation is the actual inflation in the next pe-
riod, and x is a variable with value 1 if
Exp.Inf.− Conf.Int. ≤ Inflation ≤ Exp.Inf.+ Conf.Int.
and 0 otherwise.
This expression tells you, that x will be 1, if actual inflation falls between Exp.Inf.−
Conf.Int. (3.0% in our example) and Exp.Inf.+ Conf.Int. (4.4% in our example).
The first part of the payoff function states that you will receive some payoff if the
actual value in the next period will differ from your prediction in this period for less than
4 percentage points. The smaller this difference will be, the higher the payoff you receive.
With a zero forecast error (|Inflation− Exp.Inf.| = 0), you would receive 80 units.
However, if your forecast is 1 percentage point higher or lower than the actual inflation
rate, you will get only 30 units (100/2− 20). If your forecast error is 4 percentage points
or more, you will receive 0 units (100/5− 20).
The second part of the payoff function simply states that you will get some extra
payoff if the actual inflation is within your expected interval and if that interval is not
be larger than ±4 percentage point. The more certain of the actual value you are, the
smaller interval you give, and the higher will be your payoff if the actual inflation indeed
is in the given interval but there will also be higher chances that actual value will fall
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outside your interval. In our example this interval is ±0.7 percentage points. If the actual
inflation falls in this interval you would receive 38.8 units (100/(1+0.7)−20) in addition
to the payoff from the first part of the payoff function. If the actual values is outside your
interval, your receive 0.
In the attached sheet you can find table which shows various combinations of forecast
error and confidence interval needed to earn a given number of points. See also figure on
the next page.
Information After Each Period
Your payoff depends on your predictions for the next periods and actual realization in
next period. Because the actual inflation will be only known in the next period, you will
also be informed about you current period (t) prediction and earnings after the end of
NEXT period ( t+ 1). Therefore:
• After Period 1 you will not receive any earnings, since you did not make any pre-
diction for the period 1.
• In any other period, you will receive the information about the actual inflation rate
in this period and your inflation and confidence interval prediction from previous
period. You will also be informed if the actual inflation value is in your expected
interval and what are your earnings for this period.
The units in the experiment are fictitious. Your actual payoffwill be the sum of profits
from all the periods converted to euros in 1/500 conversion.
If you have any questions please ask them now!
Questionnaire6
1. If you believe that inflation in the next period will be _ _4.2%_ _, and you are
quite sure that it will be higher than _ _ 3.5%_ _ and lower than _ _ 4.9%_ _,
you will type:
6Options (1) and (2) are pointing to the different fields on the screenshot of the experimental interface.
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Under (1) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ for inflation, and
Under (2) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ for confidence interval.
2. If you are now in period _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, you have information about past
inflation, output gap and interest rate up to period _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ and
you have to predict the inflation for period _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
11
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  Treatment 1                                                     Treatment 2
Figure S1: Simulation of inflation under alternative expectation formation rules
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  Treatment 3                                                     Treatment 4
Figure S2: Simulation of inflation under alternative expectation formation rules
13

















































5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Treatment 1-1 Treatment 1-2
Treatment 1-3 Treatment 1-4
Treatment 1-5 Treatment 1-6
Treatment 2-1 Treatment 2-2
Treatment 2-3 Treatment 2-4































































5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Treatment 3-1 Treatment 3-2
Treatment 3-3 Treatment 3-4
Treatment 3-5 Treatment 3-6
Treatment 4-1 Treatment 4-2
Treatment 4-3 Treatment 4-4































































5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Treatment 1-1 Treatment 1-2
Treatment 1-3 Treatment 1-4
Treatment 1-5 Treatment 1-6
Treatment 2-1 Treatment 2-2
Treatment 2-3 Treatment 2-4
Treatment 2-5 Treatment 2-6






























































5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Treatment 3-1 Treatment 3-2
Treatment 3-3 Treatment 3-4
Treatment 3-5 Treatment 3-6
Treatment 4-1 Treatment 4-2
Treatment 4-3 Treatment 4-4
Treatment 4-5 Treatment 4-6




























-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Inflation forecasts
Figure S7: Histogram of inflation forecasts for all treatments.
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